The Paradox of Forgiveness

    French Philosopher Jacques Derrida is known for his writings on language, meaning, and deconstruction. In his book Disgrace: On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, he explores the complexities of the idea of forgiveness, particularly as it relates to politics and foreign affairs. At the center of his argument, Derrida argues that forgiveness is a paradox- while the esoteric idea of forgiving another is possible, the manner in which people ask for forgiveness within the general political and moral ideologies of today is an impossibility. True forgiveness exists outside the political, juridical, or religious systems that attempt to contain it. However, this doesn’t mean that forgiveness is a useless endeavor, simply that the nature of its impossibility is why it remains such a transformative and vital concept. 

Derrida begins this discussion by distinguishing forgiveness from excuses, regrets, and reconciliation. Many incorrectly believe that forgiveness is synonymous with feelings of regret and making amends, but this is not the case. Reconciliation between groups of people inevitably exists within the social and political law. It hinges on some sort of “wrong” being done, as well as a “victim”, one who was harmed by the actions of another. Successful reconciliation within our current speculations requires a mechanism of reparation, of justice, that this “forgiveness” occurs under. Usually, justice is framed within a religious schema, mainly the Abrahamic traditions spread by Western colonialism. Here, forgiveness is tied to the judgment of God, at which God would absolve one of their sins given interactions with the church. When forgiveness is invoked within societies founded by these ideologies, it gets messy- while not directly tied to religion, forgiveness is inextricably tied with divine judgment.

Today, forgiveness is often utilized in political contexts, deviating from divine assessment and instead relating to the normalization of society. He names the Nuremberg Trials as a prime example of this “reconciliation”; when former Nazis plead to be forgiven for their violence against the millions of Jewish people that died during the Holocaust. However, by attempting to conjure forgiveness within a political space, it becomes diluted, becoming something transnational, with an aim to gain something. Derrida discusses the concepts of “crimes against humanity”- that is, a deliberate act to cause human suffering on a large scale. The creation of the Declaration of Human Rights, Derrida argues, was an attempt to describe methods of punishment and justice in response to these heinous crimes. The function of these accords ends up being to self-accuse, to repent, and to turn towards the past with regret, Derrids argues. As such, the declaration remains “obscure in its limits, fragile in its foundations”(Derrida, 30), and fails to reach true forgiveness. He argues that forgiveness, in its truest form, must interact with the unforgivable. Only the unforgivable calls for forgiveness, and thus, forgiveness becomes a “madness of the impossible.” (39). The very crimes that seem unforgivable are precisely the ones that demand forgiveness, but forgiveness for them appears impossible. Thus is the paradox of forgiveness. He critiques other philosopher’s opinions on the matter, such as Vladimir Jankélévitch, who asserts that forgiveness hinges on the repentance of the perpetrator; if they do not repent properly, then their forgiveness is forfeit. Derrida disagrees with this view, arguing that it reduces forgiveness to an exchange. As like with the Declaration of Human Rights, forgiveness connected to transformation ceases to be forgiveness in its purest form.

He then distinguishes between conditional and unconditional forgiveness. The examples listed above exist within conditional forgiveness: that is, that expectations are made in order for forgiveness to be granted, either by punishment or radical change. This is the entirety of political justice, and remains flawed. Once other motives are involved, forgiveness becomes polluted. Unconditional forgiveness, on the other hand, does not expect any change or repentance from the perpetrator. The “madness” of this concept is that it is nonsensical within our societal constructs of right and wrong. In order for morality to function within the laws of humanity, there must be praise of the “good” and punishment of the “bad”. In this way, pure forgiveness doesn’t aim to achieve any reconciliation, which defies any application of cause-and-effect. When conditional forgiveness is exercised, it creates a power imbalance between governing authority and sovereign power. Derrida says he dreams of “a forgiveness without power: unconditional but without sovereignty”(59): free from pre existing hierarchies and methods of control. He cites the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa, led by Desmond Tutu, as a failure of forgiveness in a nation’s healing. Tutu tried to employ forgiveness to unify the country following the events of apartheid, yet received backlash from many black communities for downplaying the suffering of POC to create artificial stability. No matter Tutu’s intentions, forgiveness in this regard remains a function of power and nothing more.

He then asks an unanswerable question: who has the right to forgive? Is it the victim, or a third party? Further, who are we asking forgiveness from: the victims, or from God? Do we forgive the crime itself, or the person? He then argues that any third party who attempts to facilitate forgiveness bars the achievement of true forgiveness, as their personal intentions and motives inevitably get involved in their judgment. In circumstances when the victim is dead or no longer present, however, it raises the question of whether forgiveness can even exist in institutional contexts.

Overall, Derrida believes that in order for forgiveness to have meaning, it must be paradoxical. It is an impossibility that defies the laws of politics and morality, yet it still may raise up virtue and promote peace. Forgiveness with a goal in mind, “A ‘finalised’ forgiveness”, ceases to be forgiveness, instead becoming “a political strategy or a psycho-therapeutic economy”(50), in the words of Derrida. Instead, true forgiveness must remain outside of time and opinion, an untouchable process of peace.

Citations

Derrida, Jacques. On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness. Routledge, 2010.